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A First Step in the Wrong Direction: Slavin v. Town of Oak
Island and the Taking of Littoral Rights of Direct Beach
Access
The North Carolina courts have long followed the lead of the
United States Supreme Court in preserving landowners' rights of
direct access to bodies of water that border their property.1 The
courts have held this to be a qualified right, however, maintaining
that the Legislature may enact rules for the protection of public rights
in navigable bodies of water.2 Generally, courts have limited the right
of direct access only when property owners have unreasonably
restricted the public's use of the beach or navigable waters, or when
the landowner's property is taken by the State in an effort to preserve
the beach.3 In the former situation, landowners are forced to remove
their obstruction of the public's use of the beach or waterway.4 In the
1. See Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atl. Hotel, 132 N.C. 517, 537, 44 S.E. 39, 45
(1903) (citing Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 504 (1871)); see also Capune v. Robbins,
273 N.C. 581, 588, 160 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1968) (holding that a pier owner did not have the
legal right to prevent someone from passing under his pier); Weeks v. N.C. Dept. of
Natural Res. & Cmty. Dev., 97 N.C. App. 215, 225, 388 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1990) (stating that
a 900-foot pier was too great an intrusion into the public's use of a body of water).
2. See Capune, 273 N.C. at 588, 160 S.E.2d at 886; Jones v. Turlington, 243 N.C. 681,
683, 92 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1956) (explaining that in the absence of any specific legislation, a
littoral proprietor holds a right of direct access to the navigable waters); Bond v. Wool,
107 N.C. 139, 148, 12 S.E. 281, 284 (1890) (stating that "a littoral proprietor and a riparian
owner, as is universally conceded, have a qualified property in the water frontage
belonging, by nature, to their land"); Pine Knoll Ass'n v. Kardon, 126 N.C. App. 155, 159,
484 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1999) (stating that riparian owners have a qualified property right in
the waterfront belonging to their land); Weeks, 97 N.C. App. at 226, 388 S.E.2d at 234
(allowing restriction of littoral rights when they substantially impair the public's use of
navigable waters). These rights apply only to navigable waters. Navigable waters are
defined as those waters which are navigable and which, in connection with other waters,
form a continuous channel for commerce. See Home Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v.
Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 68, 197 S.E. 714, 717 (1938).
3. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297,
303, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970) (permitting a pier tall enough to allow boats and
pedestrians to travel freely below it); Roanoke Rapids Power Co. v. Roanoke Navigation
& Water Power Co., 159 N.C. 393, 403, 75 S.E. 29, 33 (1912) (holding that although
riparian rights are subject to the rights of the public, they may only be taken for the public
upon due compensation); Shepard's Point Land Co., 132 N.C. at 538, 44 S.E. at 45
(holding that the property may be taken for the public good if necessary, but only upon
due compensation); Weeks, 97 N.C. App. at 226, 388 S.E.2d at 234 (denying a property
owner the right to build a pier over 900 feet into the water which would impede
navigation); In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16, 24, 337 S.E.2d 99, 104 (1985)
(arguing riparian rights may be taken only for the public trust upon due compensation).
4. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, 277 N.C. at 303, 177 S.E.2d at 516; Weeks, 97
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latter, the State has traditionally provided landowners with due
compensation.'
While this area of law has become reasonably settled over the
last century, technological advancements allowing for beach
nourishment projects have given rise to new problems that must be
balanced against the long-held direct access rights of oceanfront
property owners. In Slavin v. Town of Oak Island,6 a case of first
impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals misapplied both an
entire century of precedent as well as North Carolina's current
statutory law by allowing a municipality to deny oceanfront property
owners any reasonable right of direct access to the water without
providing compensation.7
In Slavin, the Army Corps of Engineers conducted a beach
nourishment project within the Town of Oak Island ("Oak Island").8
The nourishment project, entitled "The Turtle Habitat Restoration
Project," involved the placement of a strip of new sand on the
oceanside of the mean high water mark.9  Once the beach
nourishment was completed and the new sand in place, the title to the
new sand vested in the state.1° The project required Oak Island to
provide vegetation and maintenance for the newly created sand
dunes.1 In an effort to comply with the project's requirements, Oak
Island adopted an Access Plan. 2 The Access Plan provided for the
N.C. App. at 226, 388 S.E.2d at 234.
5. See Roanoke Rapids Power Co., 159 N.C. at 399, 75 S.E. at 33 (explaining that
riparian rights may be taken for the public good upon due consideration); Shepard's Point
Land Co., 132 N.C. at 535, 44 S.E. at 45 (explaining that riparian rights may be separated
from their owner only for public purposes and for compensation); In re Protest of Mason,
78 N.C. App. at 24, 337 S.E.2d at 104 (denying a property owner due compensation
because his riparian rights had not been taken). Due compensation refers to payment by
the government after it has taken property, usually representing the property's fair market
value. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 277 (7th ed. 1999).
6. 160 N.C. App. 57, 584 S.E.2d 100 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 659, 590 S.E.2d 271
(2003).
7. See id. at 61, 584 S.E.2d at 102 (holding that littoral rights are qualified rights and
Oak Island may restrict them without compensation).
8. Id. at 58, 584 S.E.2d at 101.
9. Id. The Corps of Engineers project manager stated that the objective of the
project is to restore the degraded sea turtle nesting habitat, to prevent death or injury to
nesting turtles and hatchlings, and to expand disposal capacity for the Atlantic Intercoastal
Waterway. Record at 250, Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 584 S.E.2d 100
(2003) (No. COA02-671) [hereinafter Record].
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (2003). The statute also states that title to land raised
above the high water mark without the help of publicly financed projects vests in the
adjacent littoral property owner. Id.
11. Record, supra note 9, at 250.
12. See id. Oak Island's Assistant Town Manager stipulated that Oak Island was not
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construction of a fence in front of the dunes along the nourished
beach. 3 The fence denied all oceanfront property owners the right to
walk directly from their property to the water or build a walkway
over the fence. 4 Oak Island's oceanfront property owners then
brought suit, alleging that the fence denied their littoral15 rights of
direct beach access without just compensation. 6 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Oak Island.17 The court of
appeals ruled in favor of Oak Island. 8 The court held that littoral
rights were not absolute, but rather were qualified and could be
subjugated, without compensation, where necessary to further public
trust protections. 9 The court further determined that Oak Island's
protection of sea turtle nesting areas satisfied the public trust
requirement.20 In December of 2003, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina denied certiorari and dismissed the property owners'
appeal.21
This Recent Development argues that the North Carolina Court
of Appeals incorrectly allowed the fence to stay and denied the
property owners' demand for due compensation. The court's decision
does not reflect the current state of North Carolina statutory or
common law for several reasons. First, the Town cannot look to its
delegated police powers for authorization. Such an action would
greatly exceed the reasonable scope of municipal police powers,
which are expressly limited to the preservation of the health, safety,
or welfare of citizens and the peace and dignity of the city.22
Additionally, the action is expressly preempted by the state statute
governing the protection of refurbished beaches, which vests this
power exclusively in the Department of Administration.2 Moreover,
required to adopt an Access Plan. Id. at 254.
13. Id. at 255.
14. Slavin, 160 N.C. App. at 59, 584 S.E.2d at 101.
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 944 (7th ed. 1999) (explaining that oceanfront
property owners possess littoral land and rights of direct access). Riparian and littoral
rights differ only in the type of water the property borders. Id. at 1328. Littoral rights are
concerned with the use of an ocean, sea, or lake, while riparian rights deal with a river or
stream. Id.
16. Slavin, 160 N.C. App. at 59, 584 S.E.2d at 101.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See Slavin, 357 N.C. 659, 590 S.E.2d 271 (2003).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-174(a) (2003).
23. See id. § 160A-174(b)(5) (prohibiting municipal regulation where there is a clear
intent by the State to regulate exclusively); id. § 146-1(a) (vesting in the Department of the
Administration responsibility for the management of all unappropriated lands, title to
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even if the court's interpretation of littoral rights as qualified rights is
correct, the pertinent case law establishes that rights of direct access
may be limited only by a clear legislative directive.2 4 Under the same
statute from which Oak Island claims authorization for the erection of
its fence, the Legislature stated that beach nourishment projects
cannot be used, in any way, to limit the full exercise of common law
rights of direct access.' In reaching its holding, the Slavin court
misinterpreted prior cases by expanding the meaning of a "qualified
right" in such a way as to limit the rights of oceanfront property
owners to an extent never before seen in the United States.26 Finally,
the Slavin decision sets a dangerous precedent from a public policy
perspective by allowing a municipality to restrict oceanfront property
owners' direct access to the water without compensation in publicly
financed beach nourishments.
This Recent Development argues that Oak Island's Access Plan
should have failed, first, because the Town lacked the statutory
authority to impair the littoral rights of oceanfront proprietors. Oak
Island attempted to justify its Access Plan by deriving such
authorization from a city's delegated police powers. 27  The General
Statutes of North Carolina provide that "a city may by ordinance
define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions,
detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and the
peace and dignity of the city, and may define and abate nuisances. '28
Thus, according to North Carolina law, if Oak Island's Access
which vests in the state); Act effective Oct. 1, 1995, ch. 529, § 5, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1917,
1923 (stating that authority under this section rests exclusively with the Department of
Administration).
24. See Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 588, 160 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1968) (explaining
that in the absence of specific legislation on the subject, littoral property owners have a
right of direct access to the water); Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atd. Hotel, 132 N.C. 517,
535, 44 S.E. 39, 45 (1903) (explaining that a waterfront property owner is entitled to all the
rights of a riparian proprietor subject to such rules as the Legislature may see proper for
the protection of public rights); Bond v. Wool, 107 N.C. 139, 146, 12 S.E. 281, 284 (1890)
(articulating that a littoral proprietor has a right of direct access to, and to build piers into,
navigable bodies of water "subject to such general rules and regulations as the legislature,
in the exercise of its powers, may prescribe").
25. § 146-1(d).
26. Slavin, 160 N.C. App. at 61, 584 S.E.2d at 101; see also infra note 80 (discussing
holdings of courts in other states).
27. See Slavin, 160 N.C. App. at 61,584 S.E.2d at 101.
28. § 160A-174(a). This statute is the first section of Chapter 160A, Article 8, dealing
with cities and towns and is titled, "Delegation and Exercise of the General Police Power."
See id. The State has delegated part of its police powers to municipalities through this
section. See Town of Atlantic Beach v. Young, 307 N.C. 422, 427, 298 S.E.2d 686, 690
(1983) (citations omitted).
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Plan falls within one of these enumerated purposes of the police
power, then the fence would be authorized by statute. It is not self-
evident that the Access Plan is necessary to preserve the "health,
safety, or welfare" of the public. It is possible that it is generally in
the best interest of the public to protect the environment, including
animals species living in the vicinity. However, the protection of sea
turtles does not necessarily require a total denial of littoral rights.
The right of private beach entry by sand footpath or structural
accessway has coexisted with public efforts to protect sea turtles in
many oceanfront communities along the North Carolina coast.2 9
Furthermore, the mere fact that an ordinance is in the interest of
public welfare does not make it a valid exercise of police power on its
own.3" The determination is whether the means employed by the
ordinance are reasonably related to the health and welfare of the
citizens of Oak Island.31
One may argue that the Access Plan is necessary to abate
nuisances 32 or preserve public convenience.33  To make this
determination, the Town would have to conclude that allowing
littoral property owners to freely pass between their property and the
beach either causes a public nuisance or restricts public convenience.
It could be argued that people trespass on the lots of vacant or
unoccupied beach homes for the purpose of using their accessways.
Such a problem could be remedied by prohibiting direct beach access
from all oceanfront property. However, it is difficult to justify such
an overinclusive restriction. Although many oceanfront property
owners are likely to be concerned about trespassers, they are likely to
29. While not expressly stating a purpose or intent to protect sea turtles, the Coastal
Area Management Act, codified in section 113A-100 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina, was enacted for a variety of reasons, including the protection of coastal wildlife.
See generally Milton S. Heath, Jr. & David W. Owens, Note, Coastal Management Law in
North Carolina: 1974-1994, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1413 (1994) (describing the development of
the Coastal Area Management Act in North Carolina).
30. See Town of Atlantic Beach, 307 N.C. at 428,298 S.E.2d at 691.
31. Id.
32. See § 160A-174(a); see, e.g., Town of Conover v. Jolley, 277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d
879 (1970) (holding that a city may not prohibit the use of a mobile home residence as a
public nuisance when it presents no threat to the health or safety of its occupants or
others); City of Fayetteville v. Spur Distrib. Co., Inc., 216 N.C. 596, 5 S.E.2d 838 (1939)
(allowing a city to prevent construction of a large gasoline tank in a congested part of the
city as an abatement of a public nuisance).
33. See City of Winston-Salem v. S. Ry. Co., 248 N.C. 637, 641, 105 S.E.2d 37, 40
(1958) (stating that the police power may be exercised reasonably for the promotion of
public safety, general welfare, and public convenience); Town of Wake Forest v. Medlin,
199 N.C. 83, 85, 154 S.E. 29, 31 (1930) (holding that the police power extends to
regulations promoting public health, public morals, public safety, and public convenience).
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be much more concerned about the denial of their littoral rights of
direct access and the resulting decrease in the value of their property.
Even if one were to interpret the North Carolina statute as
authorizing Oak Island's Access Plan as an exercise of police powers,
such authority would not apply in this situation because this
ordinance has been implicitly preempted by state statute. The
relevant statute states that a municipal ordinance must be consistent
with state law.34 It further provides that an ordinance is not consistent
with state law when "[t]he ordinance purports to regulate a field for
which a state or federal statute clearly shows a legislative intent to
provide a complete and integrated regulatory scheme to the exclusion
of local regulation."35 However, just because the State has regulated
a similar field or activity, it does not necessarily follow that local
regulation is preempted.36 When the Legislature clearly intends to
provide a complete system of regulation, local regulation must give
way.
37
Oak Island attempted to support its police powers argument by
pointing to North Carolina law, which extends the reach of municipal
police powers into the Atlantic Ocean. 8 The language of this statute
plainly authorizes municipalities to regulate littering, glass bottles,
and swimming on the beach or in the ocean.3 9 However, this statute
cannot be interpreted as empowering municipalities to deny littoral
rights to property owners who adhere to the Town's beach use
regulations.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina stated in Craig v. County
of Chatham4' that the Legislature need not expressly exclude local
regulation for such regulation to be preempted.41 The court explained
34. § 160A-174(b) (mandating that a municipal ordinance must be consistent with
North Carolina law).
35. § 160A-174(b)(5).
36. See Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 44, 565 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2002)
("[S]tatewide law does not necessarily prevent a county from regulating in the same
field.").
37. For a detailed discussion of North Carolina preemption law, see generally Christy
Noel, Recent Development, Preemption Hogwash: North Carolina's Judicial Repeal of
Local Authority to Regulate Hog Farms in Craig v. County of Chatham, 80 N.C. L. REV.
2121 (2002) (criticizing the decision in Craig as preventing local regulation of hog farms).
38. See Appellee's Brief at 13, Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 584
S.E.2d 100 (2003) (No. COA02-671) (arguing that section 160A-176.2(a) of the General
Statutes of North Carolina extends municipal authority into the ocean).
39. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-176.2(a) (2003) ("A city may adopt ordinances to
regulate and control swimming, surfing and littering in the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to that
portion of the city within its boundaries or within its extraterritorial jurisdiction . .
40. 356 N.C. 40, 565 S.E.2d 172 (2002).
41. See id. at 46, 565 S.E.2d at 175-76.
2004] 1515
1516 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
that when legislative intent is not readily apparent from the Act, it is
necessary to "primarily look to the 'spirit of the act and what the act
seeks to accomplish.' "42 However, such analysis of legislative intent
is unnecessary in the case at hand. In enacting section 146, the
General Assembly included a provision expressly restricting
regulatory authority to the State Department of Administration.43
The General Statutes of North Carolina provide that it is the
responsibility of the Department of Administration to manage all
unappropriated lands owned by the state." In addition, a 1995
amendment to subchapter I of the State Lands Act45 mandates that
"[t]he authorization established under this act applies only to the
Department of Administration and shall not be used by any other
agency to administer or regulate activities affecting the public trust. 46
The Legislature could not have expressed its intention to prohibit
local regulation of state-owned waterfront lands held in public trust
more explicitly. This provision is applicable to the case at hand
because, as the Slavin court concedes, the newly created beach in Oak
Island falls within the jurisdiction of the State Lands Act.47
The only purposes offered by Oak Island for erecting the fence
and denying littoral beach access were the protection of the newly
created sand dunes, protection of sea turtle nesting habitats on the
new beach, and the establishment of new vegetation on the beach.48
The Legislature's purpose in passing subchapter one of the State
Lands Act was to provide for the management, control, and
disposition of state-owned beaches. 49  Thus, if the Legislature
42. Id. (quoting State v. Anthony, 351 N.C. 611, 615, 528 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2000)
(quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 56, 468 S.E.2d 33, 37 (1996))) (holding that a
county could not regulate swine farmers where the State intended to regulate the
industry); see also State v. Williams, 283 N.C. 550, 554, 196 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1973) (finding
the State's uniform system of control over the sale and purchase of intoxicating beverages
to preempt the Town of Mount Airy from passing an ordinance restricting the possession
of open containers of alcoholic beverages).
43. See Act effective June 2, 1959, ch. 683, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 612, 613.
44. § 146-1(a); see also § 146-2 (granting the Department of Administration the power
to manage, control, and dispose of unappropriated lands).
45. § 146.
46. Act to Amend the Provisions of Chapter 146 Concerning State-Owned
Submerged Lands, ch. 529, § 5, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1917, 1923.
47. See Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 59-60, 584 S.E.2d 100, 101
(2003) (explaining that section 146-4(f) of the General Statutes of North Carolina vests
title to new beaches created by publicly financed nourishment projects in the state), cert.
denied, 357 N.C. 659, 590 S.E.2d 271 (2003).
48. See Record, supra note 9, at 250 (quoting Oak Island's Assistant Town Manager).
49. § 146-1(a) ("It is the purpose and intent of this Subchapter to vest in the
Department of Administration ... responsibility for the management, control and
disposition of all vacant and unappropriated lands ... title to which is vested in the
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intended to provide a complete and integrated regulatory scheme for
state-owned beach management to the exclusion of local control, then
Oak Island's Access Plan would be preempted.
If the court had found that Oak Island did not have adequate
authorization for the fence under its police powers, the Town could
have attempted to justify its actions as specifically authorized by the
Legislature. North Carolina courts have stated numerous times that
littoral property owners hold a right of direct access " 'subject to such
general rules and regulations as the Legislature, in the exercise of its
powers, may prescribe for the protection of public rights in rivers or
navigable waters.' "50 Therefore, while courts have limited property
owners' littoral rights only in situations where the property owners
were interfering with public use, the Legislature could enact
legislation to restrict littoral rights to a greater extent.
In searching for statutory authorization for the denial of littoral
rights, the Slavin court turned to the State Lands Act, which provides
for the management and control of state-owned waterfront
property. 1 There are a variety of provisions in this subchapter which
one may interpret as authorizing the fence built under Oak Island's
Access Plan. An argument may be made that the purpose clause of
the subchapter on unallocated state lands,52 which delegates to the
Department of Administration "responsibility for the management,
control, and disposition" of all such lands,53 provides authorization for
the plan itself.54 Such an interpretation would authorize the Agency
to do whatever it deems necessary to properly manage state-owned
beaches, without requiring any consideration of littoral rights.
However, this statutory provision is immediately followed by a
provision expressing the contrary intention of the Legislature. The
statute mandates that the Agency balance the rights of littoral
proprietors with its obligation to protect the public trust rights of all
citizens.56 Thus, the Legislature specifically states that the rights of
State.").
50. Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 588, 160 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1968) (quoting Bond
v. Wool, 107 N.C. 139, 146, 12 S.E. 281, 284 (1890)); O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 83,
192 S.E. 688, 689 (1937).
51. § 146-1(a) (vesting responsibility for the management, control, and disposition of
unappropriated state lands in the Department of Administration).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297,
302, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970) (applying the provisions of section 146 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina to oceanfront property).
55. § 146-1(b).
56. Id.
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littoral property owners must be taken into account when managing
public beach lands.
Despite these initial possible interpretations of the Act as
providing statutory authorization for restricting littoral rights after a
beach refurbishment, a further reading of the Act expressly refutes
any such possibility. 7 The statute plainly states, "Nothing in this
Subchapter shall be construed to limit or expand the full exercise of
common law riparian or littoral rights."58 The Legislature left nothing
for interpretation and unmistakably expressed its intent to preserve
the littoral rights of direct access vested in oceanfront property
owners.
59
If the Town possessed statutory authorization for its Access Plan,
the property owners could not challenge the existence of the fence
and the discussion would end there. As shown above, a detailed
examination of the applicable statutes reveals that the Legislature did
not purport to alter common law littoral rights at all.' Thus, the
property owners may look to the common law to remedy the denial of
their littoral rights of direct access.
There are no North Carolina cases on record where littoral rights
have been denied without compensation in circumstances similar to
those in the Slavin case. The only cases where courts have
characterized littoral rights as qualified rights in such a way as to
restrict access can be easily distinguished from the situation at hand.6'
In extreme cases, littoral property owners built structures extending
from their property which significantly restricted the public's use of
the beach or navigable waters.62 The Supreme Court of North
57. § 146-1(d).
58. Id.
59. For a more specific statute authorizing Oak Island's Access Plan, see id. § 146-
12(a), which describes the process by which littoral owners may receive authorization for
building piers from their property to deep water. This statute is particularly significant in
that it allows municipalities to determine the location of the deep water line in front of
their land. Id. Thus, the decision rests with each oceanfront town independently to
determine how far piers may protrude from littoral property. Theoretically, a town could
establish its deep water line at the very beginning of the beach, thereby preventing all
beach entry by structural accessway. However, municipalities rarely establish a deep
water line on the oceanfront side of their jurisdiction. Interview with Joseph John Kalo,
Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of
Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 15, 2004). Municipalities generally utilize this statute only
to establish deep water lines for sound front property. Id.
60. § 146-1(d).
61. See Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 590, 160 S.E.2d 881, 887 (1968); Weeks v.
N.C. Dept. of Natural Res. & Cmty. Dev., 97 N.C. App. 215, 225-26, 388 S.E.2d 228, 234
(1990).
62. See id.
[Vol. 821518
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Carolina established the standard for determining when littoral rights
must be limited in this way:
We ... adhere to our long established rule that littoral rights do
not include ownership of the foreshore.
The littoral owner may, however, in the exercise of his right of
access, construct a pier in order to provide passage from the
upland to the sea. But the passage under the pier must be free
and substantially unobstructed over the entire width of the
foreshore. This means that from low to high water mark it must
be at such a height that the public will have no difficulty in
walking under it when the tide is low or in going under it in
boats when the tide is high.63
This standard has been further clarified by two principal cases in
which North Carolina courts have limited the littoral rights of
oceanfront property owners through the characterization of the right
as a qualified one.
In the first case, Capune v. Robbins,64 the supreme court
explained that the littoral rights of oceanfront property owners do not
authorize constructing a pier that prevents passage beneath it.65 The
court affirmed that the property owner's littoral rights included the
right to build a sportfishing pier extending 1000 feet into the ocean. 66
However, the court held that the owner of the pier did not have the
right to attempt to assault a person paddling a surfboard below the
pier simply because the defendant was a littoral property owner.67 In
Capune, the court's qualification and restriction of littoral rights was
narrowly limited to situations where property owners have attempted
to use the right to prevent others from passing under piers or
walkways extending from their property.
In the second case where the court limited littoral property
rights, Weeks v. North Carolina Department of Natural Resources &
Community Development,' the North Carolina Court of Appeals
denied a sound front property owner's request to build a 900-foot pier
63. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297,
302-03, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970) (citations omitted).
64. 273 N.C. 581,160 S.E.2d 881 (1968).
65. Id. at 590, 160 S.E.2d at 887. The primary issue in Capune was whether the pier
owner had assaulted another party traveling under the pier on a paddleboard. Id. A
further issue in the case was whether littoral rights include the right to prevent others from
traveling below the pier. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 97 N.C. App. 215,388 S.E.2d 228 (1990).
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that would significantly impede navigation on the waters of Bogue
Sound.69 The court reasoned that the pier would extend into the
sound so as to substantially impede the traditional public uses of that
area.7" The court further explained that such a pier would be
substantially longer than the majority of piers in the area, which
extended only 150 to 250 feet.7' Again, the court's qualification of
littoral rights was narrowly confined to the case in which property
owners build structures from their property that significantly impede
necessary public uses of navigable waters.
Capune and Weeks describe extreme situations where property
owners exercised their littoral rights in such a way as to substantially
interfere with the public use of the beach or waterway. The Capune
and Weeks courts balanced the qualification of the littoral right
against the public's traditional rights in the navigable waters.72 The
cases illustrate that littoral rights may not be qualified simply because
their restriction serves some government purpose. The narrow
holdings of the Capune and Weeks cases. qualifying littoral rights
appear to be limited to circumstances of substantial interferences with
the public's use and enjoyment of the beach or navigable waters.
In Slavin, on the other hand, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals allowed Oak Island to completely deny littoral property
owners direct beach access, even though the owners' use of the
property did not obstruct the public's use of the beach.73 The
property owners' only potential interference with the public's use of
the beach was the potential erosion caused by foot traffic, which is no
different than that caused by the general public.74 There is, however,
no North Carolina precedent in which littoral rights have been
limited, without payment of compensation, for a purpose other than
preserving public beach and water access.
It is possible to defend Slavin by arguing that it is distinguishable
from prior cases limiting littoral rights because the Slavin case
involved a renourished beach. Oak Island argued that because title to
sand placed above the mean high tide line in a beach nourishment
69. Id. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 235.
70. Id. at 221, 388 S.E.2d at 231 (explaining that this area was commonly used for
travel by small boats and that it would be blocked by the construction of a 900-foot pier).
71. See id. at 219, 388 S.E.2d at 230.
72. Capune, 273 N.C. at 588-89,160 S.E.2d at 886-87; Weeks, 97 N.C. App. at 225-26,
388 S.E.2d at 234-35.
73. See Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 61, 584 S.E.2d 100, 101
(2003).
74. See id. at 59, 584 S.E.2d at 101 (explaining that plaintiffs simply wanted direct
access).
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project vests in the state, this strip of land cuts off the littoral rights of
oceanfront property owners.75 However, littoral property owners
have always had to cross some amount of state-owned land in order
to access the navigable waters.76 North Carolina law provides that
title to the foreshore, or the land between the high and low water
marks, vests in the state.77 Consequently, every time a littoral
proprietor accesses the deep water from his property, he must cross
the state-owned foreshore. Despite this strip of foreshore, littoral
property owners in North Carolina have always enjoyed a right of
direct access to and from the deep water and their property.78
Therefore, the fact that a thin strip of state-owned beach has been
laid between oceanfront property and the water should have no legal
effect on littoral rights of access.
Due to the lack of North Carolina case law supporting an
expanded limitation on the rights of littoral property owners and the
absence of statutory authorization for Oak Island's Access Plan, the
court of appeals is clearly breaking new ground with its holding in
Slavin. The holding stands plainly against the repeated confirmations
of North Carolina courts that a littoral property owner enjoys "(1)
[t]he right to be and remain a riparian proprietor and to enjoy the
natural advantage thereby conferred upon the land by its adjacency to
the water, [and] (2) the right of access to the water, including a right
of way to and from the navigable parts."79 But the true novelty of this
decision is even more apparent when compared to the decisions of
courts in other states across the country.8°
75. See Appellee's Brief at 5, Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 584
S.E.2d 100 (2003) (No. COAO2-571).
76. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297,
301-02, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970) (explaining that the State owns title to the foreshore).
77. Id. at 302, 177 S.E.2d at 516 (stating that in North Carolina, littoral rights do not
include ownership of the foreshore); see also West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 60, 326 S.E.2d 601,
617 (1985) ("In North Carolina private property fronting coastal waters ends at the high-
water mark and the property lying between the high-water mark and the low-water mark
known as the 'foreshore' is the property of the State.").
78. See Shephard's Point Land Co. v. Atl. Hotel, 132 N.C. 517, 537, 44 S.E. 39, 45
(1903); see also Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 589, 160 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1968)
(recognizing that while littoral property rights are qualified, they usually include the right
of access to the water); Weeks v. N.C. Dept. of Natural Res. & Cmty. Dev., 97 N.C. App.
215, 225-26, 388 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1990) (providing that a littoral property owner is not
guaranteed an absolute property right).
79. In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16, 25, 337 S.E.2d 99, 104 (1985) (citations
omitted).
80. See Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 801 (Fla. 1957); Rogers v. S. Slope Holding
Corp., 656 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 317 N.Y.S.2d
989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); see also Dalton v. Hazelet, 182 F. 561, 572 (9th Cir. 1910)
(stating that under Alaska law a railway line built between a waterfront lot and the water
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While applying slightly differing standards, the general rule in
several states is that littoral rights of access are vested property rights
that cannot be taken without due compensation. 81 For example, the
New York courts have repeatedly held that littoral property owners
have certain rights to the beach, apart from those they possess as
members of the public, that allow them unobstructed ingress and
egress from the water and their property.82 The Florida courts have
gone so far as to require that littoral owners not only be allowed a
direct access to and from the water, but also an unobstructed view of
the navigable waters.83 Mississippi encountered a situation similar to
Slavin, where the state-owned beach property between the water and
the littoral property owner. The Supreme Court of Mississippi
explained that while the state holds ownership of the submerged
lands, the owners of the adjoining lands hold a littoral right of direct
and exclusive access to the waters adjoining their property.,,
The gravity of the Slavin holding is found in its potentially broad
consequences. Presumably, one of the most attractive features of
oceanfront property is the ability to walk directly from one's doorstep
to the beach. The denial of such a right could result in a significant
decrease in the value of oceanfront property. Additionally, due to
the susceptibility of the North Carolina coast to erosion, beach
nourishment projects are becoming more common.86 After the Slavin
decision, littoral rights of access could be denied to property owners
anywhere that a publicly financed beach nourishment has taken place.
Just the possibility of a beach nourishment project could greatly
does not cut off the littoral rights of access held by the upland lot); Shorehaven Golf Club,
Inc. v. Water Res. Comm., 153 A.2d 444, 446 (Conn. 1959) (stating that the owner of land
from which the tide ebbs and flows has the exclusive right to dig channels and build
wharves so long as he does not impede navigation); Langley v. Meredith, 376 S.E.2d 519,
523 (Va. 1989) (reiterating that the riparian owner has a right of access from his property
to the navigable part of the waterway); Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v. State Dept.
of Natural Res., 588 N.W.2d 667, 675 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (reiterating that a riparian
owner has the right to use the shoreline and the right to access to the water).
81. See sources cited supra note 80.
82. See Rogers, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 173-74; Arnold's Inn, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
83. See Hayes, 91 So. 2d at 801.
84. See Harrison County v. Guice, 140 So. 2d 838, 842 (Miss. 1962).
85. It can, however, be argued that nourishment projects and the resulting erosion
prevention would increase property values more than a denial of littoral rights would
reduce them.
86. See JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 108-10 (1994); DAVID J. BROWER, ACCESS TO
THE NATION'S BEACHES: LEGAL AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 12-16 (1978); STEVEN
M. SILVERBERG & MARK S. DENNISON, WETLANDS AND COASTAL ZONE REGULATION
AND COMPLIANCE 103-04 (1993).
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reduce oceanfront property values along the North Carolina
coastline. Such adverse consequences make the Slavin decision very
troubling.
A few adjustments to Oak Island's Access Plan could yield a
workable solution. The purpose of the fence in question is to
preserve vegetation on the dunes and protect sea turtle movement.
Oak Island could adopt one of two options that would allow the
Town to keep the fence in place while still allowing property owners
direct access. First, Oak Island could provide a single gate in the
fence in front of each lot, providing a means of access while fencing
the majority of the waterfront.87 Second, the Town could keep the
entire fence in place, but allow property owners to build wooden
walkways above the fence that meet Coastal Area Management Act
("CAMA") 8 regulations.89 Either of these plans would allow the
Town to keep the vast majority of the fence in place without denying
oceanfront property owners their littoral rights. Therefore, it is
possible for littoral rights to co-exist with public efforts to protect sea
turtles.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina should have granted
certiorari in this case and should have reversed the decision of the
court of appeals, holding that Oak Island cannot restrict littoral rights
for their stated purpose without providing some form of
compensation. The court of appeals misinterpreted the nature of the
phrase "qualified rights" to mean a right that can be denied whenever
doing so serves the purposes of the state. A proper interpretation of
case law reveals that littoral rights are "qualified" only in the respect
that they may not be exercised to the detriment of public use of
beaches and navigable waters. The Slavin decision also misapplied
two state statutory provisions, interpreting them as authorizing a
town to deny littoral rights without compensation. A reversal of the
Slavin decision by the Supreme Court of North Carolina would not
have left the State without a means of keeping people off certain
87. A look at the project documentation of the Army Corps of Engineers shows an
expectation on their part that oceanfront property owners could not be denied direct
access as a result of the nourishment project. See Record, supra note 9, at 668. The Corps
stated that such easements would be needed to complete a number of tasks essential to the
Turtle Habitat Restoration Project while "reserving, however, to the littoral landowner
the right to construct a wooden walkway access structure across said easement." See id.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-100 (2003). CAMA establishes a joint program between
state and local governments for the management of coastal areas. See Heath & Owens,
supra note 29, at 1417-21.
89. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A r. 7K.0207 (July 2003) (providing certain building
requirements for structural pedestrian accessways over frontal dunes).
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parts of the beach. If a denial of access rights to littoral property
owners is necessary to protect sea turtles, the North Carolina
Legislature should pass a statute authorizing the Access Plan. Until
that time, Oak Island does not have the authority to deny the littoral
rights that oceanfront property owners have possessed in North
Carolina for over a century.
BRIAN C. FORK
